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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
SOME PROBLEMS IN THE LEGAL STATUS OF UNIONISM
WILLARD E. ATKINS,
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA.
REED KITCHEN.
T HE RECENT CASE of The Citizen's Company v. The Asheville Typo-
graphical Union' resulted from the organization of a branch of the National
Typographical Union among the employees of the Citizen's Company. It is of
particular interest not only because of the issues raised as to whether a union as
an unincorporated association can be sued as an entity and what should be the
attitude of the courts of North Carolina toward picketing, but because it suggests
the whole subject of what the State should do in the face of the growth of class
consciousness and resulting organization of labor which is certain to attend the
rapidly developing industrial life of the State.
The Citizens Company, a corporation organized under the laws of North Caro-
lina, publishes a daily newspaper in the city of Asheville. The defendants, forty-
five in number, named both as an association and as individuals, were employees
who had organized a local unincorporated branch of the National. Typographical
Union. After their organization they demanded increased wages and on being
refused, quit work.
It was then that the defendants began a series of illegal practices, admitted
on demurrer, of assault, conspiracy, trespass and general violence, as a means of
keeping other workers from taking their places while they were on strike. The
Citizens Company sought an injunction against the union and against each of the
forty-five members. The lower court refused the injunction both as to the local
union and the forty-five defendants members, on the ground that the complaint
did not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.
On appeal the action of the lower court, refusing an injunction against the
forty-five individuals composing the defendant union, was reversed by the Supreme
Court which, at the same time, sustained the refusal to enjoin the defendant union,
holding that the union, an unincorporated association, was not suable and not sub-
ject to the court's decrees.
II
The issue as to the right to picket arose from the fact the defendants
by demurrer admitted having an organized picket line established about plaintiff's
premises and seeking by threats, intimidation and violence to deter employees
from laboring for plaintiff. The court says, "Any group or individual has a right
to organize and use all peaceful means to protect their rights, but such groups
cannot resort to illegal means to further their aims as violence, assault, conspiracy,
trespass or any other actionable wrong."
1187 N. C. 42.
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The opinion of Chief Justice Taft in the case of the American Steel Found-
ries v. Tri-City Council and others is quoted:
"How far can men go in persuasion and communication and still not violate
the right of those whom they would influence? In going to and from work, men
have a right to free passage without obstruction as the streets afford, consistent
with the right of others to enjoy the same privilege. We are a social people, and
the accosting by one of another in an inoffensive way and an offer by one to com-
municate and discuss information with a view to influencing the other's action are
not regarded as aggression or violation of that other's rights. If, however, the
offer is declined, as it may rightfully be, then persistence, importunity, following
and dogging become unjustifiable annoyance and obstruction which is likely soon
to savor of intimidation. From all of this the person sought to be influenced has
a right to be free and his employer has a right to have him free."
That union men, to use the language of the court, "have a legal right to have
a reasonable number for peaceful picketing, but this cannot be attended by any
disorder, intimidation, or obstruction but only by observation, watching, and per-
suasion," would seem to be the proper attitude for the law to take despite the fact
a number of courts have reached other conclusions.
2
The reason why decisions governing picketing conflict is not difficult to under-
stand. Truly peaceful picketing means little more than a man has a right to put
a sandwich sign on his back and advertise to the public and to employees that the
plant in front of which he walks is not fair'to organized labor. Theoretically,
according to the courts that speak for peaceful picketing he has a right to speak to
employees and tell them about his cause if he does so without manifesting any
species of intimidation. But the employee who is taking the place of the striking
worker is likely to know that a strike is on, and in the nature of things doesn't
care to talk matters over. He is satisfied to be left alone and, in fact, is likely to
fear for his safety. no matter how innocent an approach is made to him by either
pickets, or a picket. The reason for this is simply that he senses a real human
situation.
It is well to keep in mind that one of the assumptions of unionism is the right
of a man to his job. This assumption, of course, has not legal standing but it does
account for the fact that when a man strikes he does not mentally give up his job.
He is absenting himself from it until the employer comes to terms. Because of
the insecurity which a worker feels, few crimes are greater than that of taking his
job, and talking peacefully and stopping at that is exercising a degree of restraint
that is not likely'to be present if it looks like force or intimidation will clinch the
matter. In no sense can such tendencies receive legal recognition. Law and the
continued existence of orderly society demand that every tendency toward force
a In a decision of the Appellate Court in Chicago June 19, 1921, in re the striking employees of the
American Cigar Company the court argues: "There is no such thing as peaceful picketing. The fact of
establishing a picket line by appellants is evidence of their intention to annoy, embarrass, and to intimidate
the employees of the appellee company whether they resort to violence or not. The decisions have abund-
antly established that as the law of the state." And even more emphatic is the decision in Atchison,
Topeka, and Santa Fe R.R. v. Gee: "There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing any more
than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching."
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must be blocked, and every act of force must answer for its commission. The
point is that the philosophy of the striking man and the goals which he and the
union are seeking tend to make picketing in action something more than peaceful
device, simply because when kept in peaceful bounds it is ineffective. Thus to
hold that peaceful picketing is legal in most cases means little more to labor than a
court mandate that all picketing is illegal.
This does not mean that it makes no difference whether courts decide that
peaceful picketing is legal, or that all picketing, being necessarily other than peace-
ful, is illegal. Even though it be true that peaceful picketing in practice means
that labor is allowed an exceedingly limited range of activities, it is one thing to
say, "Go ahead as far as you go ahead peacefully"; it is another thing to say,
"You can not use picketing at all." Coercion or the appearance of it is a thing to
be conserved and used only to the extent it is necessary.
III
More important than the question of picketing is the decision that an unin-
corporated union cannot be sued in North Carolina.
I This holding is apparently in line with previous decisions in North CArolina.
In the case of Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line,3 an action was brought upon the
contract of an association, the Relief Department of the Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
way. The court stated that it was necessary that "a potential, actually existent
defendant" be named or the action must be dismissed. The court described an
unincorporated agency as "neither a natural nor an artificial being" and as "neither
incorporated nor a separate entity," but rather as "being nothing." It further
added that "the court will not pass upon the validity of a contract, when it appears
that there is no defendant before it" and that the plaintiff in such a case is no
better off than if the summons had been served on an infant in an action on
contract.
In Kerr v. Hicks4 the court again held "a corporation has only such powers as
are conferred by the charter,-and a voluntary association has no existence or
power, except as contained in its formal articles of agreement, or established by
custom acquiesced in by all the parties to it."
In some jurisdictions statutes have been passed to cope with the problems
which such holdings bring about, but as far as one can judge the question of mak-
ing associations responsible for their acts has not been a very vital one in North
Carolina. Indeed, except for a lone statute providing for the suit of a church
group as a quasi-corporation there seems to be no outstanding evidence of lack
of incorporation constituting a social problem.
'147 N. C. 104, 60 S. E. 724.
4 154 N. C. 268. 70 S. E. 468.
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Even before enabling statutes in various states began to provide a remedy
for this situation,5 equity courts recognized the shortcomings of such decisions
and began to permit action to be brought by and against certain members of such
unincorporated agencies through certain representatives of such organizations
selected for the purpose and recognized by law as empowered to represent all the
members. This was done only in case where it was impossible, owing to numerous
members, to bring all into court, individually. Also the favorite equitable use of
estoppel often served to evade the common law disability of non-suability as where
such an organization held itself out as a corporation and acting on this belief the
plaintiff enters into relation with the association, the association has been estopped
to deny its corporate liability.
Back of the conceptions of law courts and the adaptations conceived by equity
lies the fact that at common law the right to incorporation, being subject to the
exercise of sovereign prerogative, was jealously guarded. Even though an asso-
ciation appeared to possess great power, nevertheless, without the royal franchise,
it was not recognized before the law. The dignity attending incorporation was to
be conferred only directly by the sovereign and for a court to recognize an asso-
ciation as an entity was to do only what a sovereigfi had a right to do. Incorpor-
ation was looked upon as an enabling process.
In the process of time, however, unincorporated associations have enlarged
both in number and membership with such attending power that to continue to
hold them as "being nothing" is to save the king's prerogative at a cost which may
be too large. Indeed, incorporation may be deliberately avoided by these asso-
ciations since it threatens to be a restrictive device, a fact which may make it
necessary to the interests of people harmed by the. acts of an association, that such
groups be held responsible even though not incorporated. 6
One of the outstanding decisions handed down in late years with regard to
the suability of unincorporated associations is the case of United Mine Workers
of America et al v. The Coronado Coal Company et al. Just what the case holds
s These statutes began to appear as early as 1849, New York taking the lead. Lord Eldon in Lloyd v.
Loaring. 6 Ves. 773, 778, granted to a body of Free Masons in 1802 the right to a representative suit
stating that it was "singular that this court should sit upon the concerns of an association which in law
has no existence" but that the society "must some way or other be permitted to sue." The fact that Lord
Eldon was a member of the Middle Temple was possibly no more a reason for such a decision than the
fact that without the right to suit the gravest injustice would occur.
OAn able article written by Wesley A. Sturgis in the Yale Law Journal of February, 1924, concludes:
(1) It is believed that the power to sue or the liability to be sued by their association name was denied
to associates of unincorporated associations by the courts for the reason that they considered such attempts
a usurpation of corporate franchises, which must lie in grant from the sovereign.
(2) That the formula of the present day cases that unincorporated associations cannot sue or be sued
because they are not legal entities separate from their members, is but a method of statement employed to
give effect to this real reason. That so far as present day courts are not moved to their decision in accord
with the general rule on this or some other independent ground, there is no reason or justification for the
decision-that it is no reason in itself why the associates cannot sue or be sued in their association name
to say that an unincorporated association is not a legal entity separate from its members.
(3) That the present status of the general rule is that of a technical matter of form in our procedure,
and that it is cause of unnecessary inconvenience.
(4) That it can well be abolished by the courts of their own motion and suits allowed to be brought in
the association name.
(5) That service of process upon a principal officer should be sufficient to authorize judgment and
execution thereon in the first instance against the common property, with supplementary proceedings there.
after (or a new action in case of the non-resident members) against any members individually who ,.re
u d juris and subject to service of process for any deficiency upon such execution.
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is a matter upon which there is no common agreement. The case is not cited by
the North Carolina court presumably because it was thought the holding is con-
trolled by the provisions of paragraphs 7 and 8 of the anti-trust law. This con-
clusion, however, is open to question. The student of that case should note Chief
Justice Taft's reasoning:
"Undoubtedly at common law, an unincorporated association of persons was
not recognized as having any other character than a partnership in whatever was
done, and it could only sue or be sued in the names of its members and their
liability had to be enforced against each member. But the growth and necessities
of these great labor organizations have brought affirmative legal recognition of
their existence and usefulness and provisions for their protection, which their
members have found necessary. Their right to maintain strikes when they do
not violate law or the rights of others has been declared. The embezzlement of
funds by their officers has been especially denounced as a crime. The so-called
union label, which is a quasi trade mark to indicate the origin of manufactured
product in union labor, has been protected against pirating and deceptive use by
the statutes of most of the States, and in many States authority to sue to enjoin
its use has been conferred on unions. They have been given distinct and separate
representation and the right to appear to represent union interests in statutory
arbitrations and before official labor boards. More than this, equitable procedure
adapting itself to modern needs has grown to recognize the need of representation
by one person of many, too numerous to sue or to be sued, and this has had its
influence upon the law side of litigation, so that out of the very necessities of the
existing conditions and the utter impossibility of doinq justice otherwise, the
suable character of such an organization as this has come to be recognized in some
jurisdictions,7 and many suits for and against labor unions are reported in which
no question has been raised as to the riqht to treat them in their closely united
action and functions as artificial persons capable of suing and being sued.8 It
would be unfortunate if an organization with as great power as this International
Union has in the raising of large funds and in 'directing the conduct of four
hundred thousand members in carrying on, in a wide territory, industrial con-
troversies, and strikes, out of which so much unlawful injury to private rights is
possible could assemble its assets to be used therein free from liability for injuries
by torts committed in course of such strikes. To remand persons injured to a suit
aqainst each of the 400,000 members to recover damages, and to levy on his share
of the strike fund, would be to leave them remediless."9
It should be noted also that Chief Justice Taft, seemingly in summary,
continues:
"Though such a conclusion as to the suability of trades unions is of primary
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from possibility of oppression and injury in their lawful rights from the existence
of such powerful entities as trade unions it is after all in essence and principle
merely a procedural matter."
Especially should attention be given to the first part of the succeeding sen-
tence which ties the case to the Anti-Trust Law:
"Our conclusion as to the suability of the defendants is confirmed in the case
at bar by the words of sections 7 and 8 of the Anti-Trust Law.10 The persons who
may be sued under section 7 include corporations and associations existing under
or authorized by the laws of the United States, the laws of any of the territories,
the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country," section 8. This lan-
guage is very broad and words given their natural signification certainly include
labor unions like these. They are, as has been abundantly shown, associations
existing under the laws of the United States of the territories thereof and of the
States of the Union. Congress was passing drastic legislation- to remedy a threat-
ening danger to the public welfare and did not intend that any persons or com-
binations should escape its application. Their thought was especially directed
against business associations and combinations that were unincorporated to do the
things forbidden by the act, but they used language broad enough to include all
associations which might violate its provisions recognized by the statutes of the
United States or the States or the territories or foreign countries as lawfully
existing and this, of course, includes labor unions as the legislation referred to
shows."
Putting Chief Justice Taft's argument into smaller compass it seems that he
holds unions suable because of (1) the growth and necessities of such organiza-
tions with the legal recognition that has attended their development, (2) the prac-
tice of equity in allowing suits against one person who represents "many too many
to sue or be sued," a practice which has been allowed at law against labor unions
in many cases without question being raised, (3) that public policy requires such
responsibility and power with regard to unions, and (4) that sections seven and
eight of the Anti-Trust Law make the case very clear. If the reader will follow
the reasoning given for the fourth point he will see that it rests upon the preceding
logic-the Anti-Trust Law simply is additional proof of what would be equally
true without the law.11
"Italics ours.
21In discussing the case Professor Felix Frankfurter of the Harvard Law School subscribes to the
opinion that an unincorporated union is liable to suit as a union. Moreover, he defends "No one wiU
dispute for a moment that if the United Mine Workers Union incurs debts either for money borrowed or
for a printer's bill it is amenable to law for the payment of such debts. But bring into question the
amenability of the United Mine Workers to suit for money damages or to injunction for picketing in tb
course of a strike and a clash of opinion is at once produced. But it is the same United Mine Workers'
See 31 New Republic 329-30.
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Iv
As suggested above the North Carolina court takes no cognizance of this case.
In defense of its position in regard to the freedom of a union from suit, if unin-
corporated, the Supreme Court of North Carolina quotes from the opinion of Chief
Justice Clark in Tucker v. Eatough :12
"If contrary to common law, an action could be brought without authority of
a statute against an unincorporated body, it could be permissible for any person
to bring an action against the Confederate Veterans' Association, or the American
Legion, or the League of Women Voters, or any unorganized body upon an
allegation that one of their members had committed the libel or other legal wrong
against the person bringing the action."
In as far as the statement means that no unincorporated group should be held
for the unauthorized and wholly personal action of one who chances to be a mem-
ber it is not to be questioned. And neither would an incorporated society be
responsible under such circumstances. Insofar as it means that a trade union is
similar to these organizations it is open to question. The Confederate Veterans
Association, The American Legion and The League of Women Voters are less
clearly defined as organizations whose economic interests are in conflict with those
of other people. The Confederate Veterans Association is clearly unlike a labor
union in its conduct. As for The American Legion, although it is interested in
the care of its members, especially the disabled, and has recently actively engaged
in a campaign for a bonus, it is in essence much like the former organization. Both
give opportunity for the expressions of pride, justifiable pride, as we all agree,
and they help members to live over experiences and through exchanging them
secure an enhancement of feeling that is in no sense unworthy. As for the League
of Women Voters, a loose association for the purpose of educating women in
political matters, there is a non-partisan attitude and an absence of even a kindred
feeling. In contrast a union is an economic institution, built on a sameness of
interests, which at the same time challenges employing interests. It is an organi-
zation for conducting offensives into quarters that may involve harm to the other
side, to those who oppose. It recalls experience only as a means of enhancing the
morale and getting the fighting spirit up for the next contest. In the minds of its
members it is a device which enables the worker to meet his next grocery bill, to
provide for his wife and family. It is a fighting organization. To the degree it
emphasizes interests in opposition to those of the employer and takes as its purpose
that of constantly fighting for more and more and more, it possesses possibilities
of extensive and paralyzing activity with damage so far reaching that to remand
the sufferer to a suit against individual members is to leave him remediless. More-
over, if the American Legion or any other unorganized group in operation did
work great legal wrong it would be a doubtful public policy which would state that
they hould be exempt from liability as an organization when the legal recourse
2186 N. C. 509.
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against individual members would not be sufficient, and when perhaps it had
avoided incorporation for the very purpose of being in an irresponsible situation
if anything did occur. 13
The point is that because certain groups are incorporated is not final proof
that the rule of law applying to them should be wholly similar. If in their behavior
unincorporated groups differ, and if these differences do not constitute an unrea-
sonable basis for classification, then there is a basis for different standing at law.
The most obvious thing is that the Confederate Veterans Association is unincor-
porated as are unions; the less obvious but more substantial thing is that the fac-
tors which explain the existence of these two organizations are wholly different
and that the behavior of the union as an unincorporated association presents social
problems which constitute a reasonable basis for adopting a different attitude
toward it on the part of the law.
V
It is not difficult to see why the union desires to escape complete responsibility
as a suable unit. Unions feel, whether true or not, that they operate at a disad-
vantage when they meet the employer in the court because of his greater knowledge
of the law and his ability to secure the most expert aid, as well as the fact, and it
may be partly a result of the first reason, that the courts appear to them to be pre-
judiced in favor of employers. In fact unionism is a challenge to the status quo,
an offensive against traditional conceptions, and like any challenging idea likely
at some time to meet with the opposition of the law, which after all, is seeking to
give utterance to commonly accepted ideas. Moreover there has been the feeling
that the anomalous situation unionism has commonly occupied before the law has
meant a maximum of power with a minimum of responsibility. Add to this the
fact that with the breaking of amicable relationships with employers, with em-
ployees out of work and threatened with the possibility that they may not be able
to return at all, with families to be cared for while the pay envelope is missing,
and with mounting feeling arising through the association, on street corners and
union quarters of the men out on strike, with leadership at best never in complete
control, who knows what may not happen? Once a union assumes the dignity of
an entity and is made responsible at law it might not be a difficult thing for an
employer to show cause enough for enjoining the use of union funds that the
union would be helpless in the pursuit of the strike.
Moreover, a union engages in other activities than merely waging war on
employers. In most cases there are agreements regarding death benefits, out of
work allowances, aid in case of sickness, etc. These agreements are usually lived
up to but if a union is on a strike it is the policy to meet the obligation only if
meeting them does not interfere with the successful prosecution of the strike. If
legally responsible every union would be likely to have its funds enjoined either
For discussion of the confusion which exists at law because of the unwillingness of courts to recognize
the reality of unincorporated associations see 29 Harvard Law Review 404, in which Harold J. Laski lays
down the thesis "the distinction between incorporate and voluhtary associations must be abolished."
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by a bona fide or a "planted" member because the pursuit of the strike threatened
to or actually did involve a breach of these obligations. On the other hand, it
might well be true, as Newton D. Baker has observed, that if a union were held
responsible for its acts, that fact might reduce the success of employers in securing
injunctions, create among the public a more favorable feeling in its behalf since
they will appear to be a group to themselves with respect to the law, and create
among labor organizations a new sense of dignity and responsibility and so whet-
ting their desire to place their controversies upon a higher plane.
It may well be argued that in the present state of uncertainty of the law
in regard to striking and boycotting and the promiscuous use of the injunction by
the employer to hold a union to be suable is to sound the death knell of collective
bargaining and involves the exploitation of a group in society that is without
power to match itself against employing interests on anything like an equal basis.
The issues are not purely legalistic but are shot through and through with eco-
nonic considerations. Moreover, in deciding that a union is suable a court inevi-
tably raises a whole series of questions as to what should be the public policy. The
way out, however, would seem not to be through side-stepping the logic of the
situation as the case comes before the bar, but to meet the issue on its merits, in
light of precepts and legal principles, leaving it to the public to legislate contrari-
wise if it sees fit. And while the public is at the task it may well consider the
whole problem of what should be the status of the law not only as to suability of
unincorporated labor unions but what should be the status of the strike, 14 the boy-
cott, the blacklist, and what limitations should be placed upon the use of the
injunctions. The State of North Carolina is now experiencing an industrial revo-
lution that is not dissimilar to that experienced by England and the northern
industrial states. There is no reason to believe that we will not face a growing
class consciousness on the part of our workers which will be reflected in the growth
of unionism and the insistence upon collective bargaining. Conflicts between
employers and employed cannot be avoided. It is the better part of wisdom to
recognize this fact and to attempt to reduce the zone of conflict to the less socially
costly fields through indicating in detail by statutory enactment the exact status of
unions, the devices which they may employ, and the extent to which they may use
them in seeking their goals.
14 Consider the unsatisfactory situation regarding the legality of the strike. The courts declare a peace.
ful strike legal or illegal on the basis of malicious intent or motive as if such a thing were clear In a
given situation and as if in a given case there might not be more than one motive indeed contradictory
motives operating at the same time. Take a specifice case: A group of workers strike because ait employ'er
has not met their demands and discharged a non-union worke . The courts approach the case by arfulng
that if the strike is intended primarily and directly intended to benefit the workers and only incidentally to
harm the employer or the employee whose discharge is demanded, then the strike is lawful. If the
reverse be true then it is unlawful. What is the consequence? Some courts see in such a situation an
attempt to break contracts, to force a non-union man out of a job. To them it looks like a clear case of
a motive to injure. Other courts see in the situation a defensive fight on the part of the union for its
very existence for. they reason, if non-union men are allowed to remain in the employ of the firm with
which the union is dealing will not the employer use that man and others like hinx to undermine union
standards, supplant union workers, break the union, and force a discontinuance of collective bargaining?
Both views are logical depending entirely upon the point of view of the court. The rule alone leads to
either decision with eaus1 ease.
